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The Return of Novorossiya:
Why Russia's
Intervention in Ukraine Exposes the Weakness of
International Law
Adam Twardowski*
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War unleashed optimism that a new
relationship between the West and Russia could be grounded in
mutual adherence to international norms and institutions.'
Although Russia's emergence from its Soviet mold was hobbled
by economic turmoil and political corruption,2 its attempt to
instigate democratic and legal reforms 3 and later enter the
WTO 4 suggested that the geopolitical divide between the West
and Russia had been supplanted by Russia's desire to integrate
itself into the global economy. However, the events of 2014 and
2015 in Ukraine have dashed the West's hopes about Russia's
* I would like to thank my mother, Malgorzata Twardowska, for her love and
sacrifices throughout the years, and my grandparents, Halina and Zbylut
Twardowski, for their unwavering support. Thanks also to the staff of the
Minnesota Journal of International Law, particularly Jacob Lundborg and

Huan Lou, for their assistance.
1. See Charles William Maynes, Squandering Triumph: The West
Botched the Post-Cold War World, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 15,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54616/charles-williammaynes/squandering-triumph-the-west-botched-the-post-cold-war-world.
2. See generally Alexander Domrin, Corruption in the Name of
"Democracy": The USA and Russia in the 1990s, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 117
(2009).
3. See Whitney Cale, Through the Russian Looking Glass: The
Development of a Russian Rule of Law and Democracy, 7 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L.
REV. 93, 108-10 (2010); Sarah E. Cox, Note, Reverse Revolution: Russia's
ConstitutionalCrisis, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 179, 181 (2013).

4. See National Security Project, A Bull in Bear's Clothing: Russia, WTO,
and Jackson-Vanik 33 (Bipartisan Pol'y Ctr., Task Force Paper, 2012),
available
at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/Russia%20Staff%20Paper.pdf.
5. See TOM BJORKMAN, RUSSIA'S ROAD TO DEEPER DEMOCRACY 103
(2003).
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transformation into a norms-respecting power. Russia's
annexation of Crimea 7 and subsequent occupation-in-all-butname of eastern Ukraine 8 have not only raised the likelihood of
a new protracted geopolitical standoff, but also denigrated
international legal norms designed to provide consultative
processes for the diffusion of interstate tensions.9

The

crisis

in eastern

Ukraine

began when former

President Viktor Yanukovych declined to sign an association

agreement with the European Union ("EU") that would have
paved the way for Ukraine's admission into that transnational
polity.'0 Widespread popular anger over Yanukovych's action
resulted in the eruption of protests in Kiev that eventually led
to his ouster and to a period of protracted internal turmoil."
Yanukovych's successors pledged to renew efforts to integrate
Ukraine into the EU. 2 In response, Russia annexed Crimea
and began supporting an armed rebellion in the eastern part of
Ukraine in order to keep the country entrenched in Russia's
orbit. Russian President Vladimir Putin's use of the Tsarist
6. See generally John Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's
Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
2014, at 77, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-jmearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault.
7. See Steven Pifer, Will the Russian Military Move Beyond Crimea?,
2PARAGRAPPHS (March 4, 2014), http://2paragraphs.com/2014/03/will-therussian-military-move-beyond-crimea/.
8. See Andrew E. Kramer & Michael R. Gordon, Ukraine Reports
Invasion on a New Front, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014108/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovskcrimea.html? r=0.
9. See Himanil Raina, Legal Questions of Russia's Intervention in
Ukraine (ISSSP Reflecions, No. 14, 2014), available at http://isssp.in/russianintervention-in-crimea-geopolitical-consequences-legal-perspectives/.
10. See David Herszenhorn, Facing Russian Threat, Ukraine Halts Plans
for Deals with E.U., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/world/europe/ukraine-refuses-to-free-exleader-raising-concerns-over-eu-talks.html?pagewanted=all.
11. See Nadia Diuk, Euromaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution,
WORLD
AFF.,
Mar.-Apr.
2014,
at
9,
available
at
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine%E2%80%99sself-organizing-revolution.
12. Department of Information and Communication of the Secretariat of
the CMU, Arseniy Yatsenyuk: Agreement with EU is Intended to Upgrade
Ukraine's Economy, UKRAINIAN GOV'T PORTAL (June 25, 2014, 2:01 PM),
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art id=247415048&cat id=2
44314975.
13. See Uri Friedman, Putin's Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia's
Takeover
of
Crimea, ATLANTIC
(Mar.
2,
2014,
10:32
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.conminternational/archive/2014/03/putins-playbook-
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term Novorossiya ("New Russia") 4 in reference to historically
Russian territories in eastern Ukraine raised fears that his
ambitions might extend to other Eastern European states with
Russian-speaking populations. 15 Although tensions have since
cooled and both sides have pledged to pursue efforts to diffuse
the conflict, questions remain about the sustainability of the
ceasefire and what the long-term implications of Russia's
intervention in Ukraine on International Law will be.
This note will argue that Russia's annexation of Crimea
and subsequent intervention in eastern Ukraine are evidence
that international norms do not effectively constrain the
behavior of states when violating those norms serves their
perceived interests. The recent events in Ukraine suggest that
states tend to pursue their geopolitical interests regardless of
the constraints theoretically imposed on them by International
Law. Part I will sketch a historical overview of the conflict
between Ukraine and Russia with a particular focus on the
aims and interests Russia regards as central to its security visk-vis Ukraine. Part II will provide an overview of the
International Law norms implicated by Russia's intervention in
Ukraine. Part III will outline a realistic critique of the ability of
International Law to constrain interstate aggression.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE
The underlying roots of the present conflict extend far back
into the history of both Russia and Ukraine and involve
overlapping notions of national identity. Modern-day Ukraine
is split between identities that clash at all levels of society. 6 Its

eastern half is Russian-speaking, Orthodox, and - arguably,
until recently - sees Ukraine as a natural part of Russia's

the-strategy-behind-russias-takeover-of-crimea/284154/.
14.

See President of Russia Vladimir Putin Addressed Novorossaiy

Militia, RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE (Aug. 29, 2014, 1:10 AM),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22863.
15. See Roger McDermott, Putin's War for Novorossiya, JAMESTOWN
FOUNDATION
(Sept.
2,
2014,
4:35
PM),
http://www.jamestown.org/singleftx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=42772&tx ttne
ws%5BbackPid%5D=381&cHash=7eafd3375c32b123bddc142df678c2ld#.VC7k
5NTF-cw.
16. See Orlando Figes, Is There One Ukraine?, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 16,
2013),

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140560/orlando-figes/is-there-

one-ukraine.
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orbit. 17 Its western half is Ukrainian-speaking, Catholic, and
aspires to integrate into Europe.
This division reflects
Ukraine's difficult journey to independence and its historically
evolving geographic boundaries.' 9
Russia, on the other hand, has long challenged the West
with its multisided identity. Geographically straddling both
Europe and Asia, Russia's history has been shaped by its
mystical Orthodox faith,2 ° the vastness of its borders (together
with a chronic fear about maintaining their security and
integrity), 2' and the "messianic" mission thought by many
Russians during both the Tsarist and Soviet periods to animate
their foreign policy.22 To understand Russia's deep interest in
Ukraine's place in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, it is first necessary
to consider their deeply interwoven history.

A. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY
AND INDEPENDENCE
Separated from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine's
history as an independent State has been relatively short. 23
Prior to its 72-year membership in the Soviet Union, the
territory now comprising Ukraine shifted between a long
succession of polities, including the Russian Empire and,
earlier, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.24 Together with
17. See generally MIKHAIL A. MOLCHANOV, POLITICAL CULTURE AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS (2002).
18. Id.

19.
Crisis,

Eve Conant, How History, Geography Help Explain Ukraine'sPolitical
NAT'L

GEOGRAPHIC

(Jan.

29,

2014),

http://news.nationalgeographic.comlnews/2014/01/140129-protests-ukrainerussia-geography-history/.

20. See Robert Blitt, Russia's "Orthodox" Foreign Policy: The Growing
Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia's Policies
Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 363, 368 (2011).
21.

See ROBERT KAPLAN, THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY: WHAT THE MAP

TELLS Us ABOUT COMING CONFLICTS AND THE BATTLE AGAINST FATE 159
(2012).
22.

See HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 57 (2014).

23. See Philip Chase, Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic
Conflict Under the Contemporary Model of Sovereignty, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 222 (1996).
24. See Zenon E. Kohut, The Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and
Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture
17 (Kennan Institute, Occasional Papers Series #280, 2001), available at

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF2C9.pdf.
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Russians and Belarusians, Ukrainians trace their historical
lineage to the Kievan Rus, a loose federation of East Slavic
tribes in Europe from the 9h to the mid-13th century.5 The
origins of modern Ukrainian nationalism can be traced to the
17th century Ruthenian uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth after which Bohdan Khmelnytsky established
the short-lived Cossack Hetmanate. 6 The Russian Empire
eventually absorbed most of that polity, but Khmelnytsky's
achievement of independence from Poland cemented his stature
as a major nationalist hero in Ukraine's collective memory.27
Modern Ukraine emerged from the ashes of the Russian
Revolution of 1917, an event that galvanized Ukraine's
national movement and led to the formation of several
Ukrainian polities in formerly Russian and Austro-Hungarian
lands from 1917 until 1920.28 Under the Peace of Riga at the

conclusion of the Polish-Soviet War, western Ukraine was
incorporated into Poland, which in turn recognized the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in March 1919.29 Three
years later, it became a founding member republic of the Soviet
Union. 30

Although it endured enormous trauma during the height of
Stalinist terror in the 1930s 3l and the ensuing Second World
War, 32 Ukraine was a key industrial and agricultural
powerhouse in the Soviet Union. 33 Soviet authorities in the
post-Stalin era intermittently allowed waves of "Ukrainization"
which, among other policies, restored the Ukrainian language

25. See JOHN CHANNON & ROBERT HUDSON, PENGUIN HISTORICAL ATLAS
OF RUSSIA 16 (1995).
26. See PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI, A HISTORY OF UKRAINE 231 (1996).
27. See Andreas Kappeler, From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a
Transnational Ukrainian History, in A LABORATORY OF TRANSNATIONAL
HISTORY: UKRAINE AND RECENT UKRAINIAN HAGIOGRAPHY 52-53 (Georgiy
Kasianov & Philipp Terr eds., 2009).
28. RExA. WADE, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917, at 155 (2005).
29. See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 419-20 (2d ed. 1968).
30. See CHANNON & HUDSON, supra note 25, at 526.
31. See generally SERHY YEKELCHYK, STALIN'S EMPIRE OF MEMORY:
RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET HISTORICAL IMAGINATION
(2004).
32. See Bohdan Krawchenko, Soviet Ukraine Under Nazi Occupation,
1941-4, in UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II: HISTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH 15 (Yury
Boshyk ed., 1986).
33. See MARTIN MCCAULEY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
145 (2013).
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to a place of prominence in Ukrainian national life.34 Following
the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine
commenced the formidable task of building up institutions of a
newly independent State that had not yet truly stood on its
own feet in modern times. 5 With extensive documentation of
deeply rooted corruption and a stagnant economy, 36the country's
journey to modernity has still not been completed.
B. UKRAINE IN THE RUSSIAN WORLDVIEW
"Everything about Russia - its absolutism, its size, its
globe-spanning ambitions and insecurities - stood as an
implicit challenge to the traditional European concept of
international
order
built
on
equilibrium
and
restraint."37
As noted earlier, both Russia and Ukraine trace their
historical roots to the Kievan Rus.38 The importance of Kiev in
Russia's own historical narrative puts that city, presently
situated in the geographic heart of modern Ukraine, firmly
within Russians' conception of their patrimony. 39
However, shared historic roots do not alone explain why
Russia persistently regards Ukraine's integration into the West
as a major strategic problem. 40 A more comprehensive
understanding of this attitude stems from basic geopolitical
calculations of security and power. Ever since the end of the
Cold War, one of Russia's principle strategic fears has been the
encroachment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") into its traditional sphere of influence. 41 Given the
34.

See

35.

See SARAH WHITMORE, STATE-BUILDING IN UKRAINE: THE UKRAINIAN

Ukrainization,

INTERNET

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

UKRAINE,

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.conmdisplay.asp?linkpath=pages%5CU%5C
K%5CUkrainization.htm.

PARLIAMENT, 1990-2003, at 1 (2004).
36. See generally Tom Keatinge, Ukraine's Own Worst Enemy, FOREIGN
AFF.

(July

31,

2014),

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141695/tom-

keatinge/ukraines-own-worst-enemy.
37. See KISSINGER, supra note 22, at 50.
38. See CHANNON & HUDSON, supranote 25.
39. Id. at 51.
40. See Jamila Trindle, The West's Tricky Economic War with Russia,
FOREIGN
POL'Y
(Sept.
3,
2014),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/03/ukraine sanctions europe ru
ssia-economic war nato ceasefire.
41. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 78, 82.
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longstanding importance of Ukraine's geographic position
between Russia and the West - an importance that has been
evident in key moments in Russia's recent military history42 Russia's chief strategic concern is that Ukraine's admission
into NATO would fatally expose its western flank during a
military conflict, giving NATO-allied states an upper hand.43
NATO was founded in 1949 as a collective defense system
to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe by placing
Western Europe under America's nuclear umbrella.4 4 As the
Cold War drew to a close, however, the Soviet Union expressed
a desire that NATO continue to exist in Europe under the aegis
of American power to keep newly reunified Germany peaceful.45
This desire was concurrently paired with strong opposition to
any enlargement of NATO, with Soviet leaders warning
repeatedly that they would not tolerate NATO operating at the
Soviet Union's vulnerable western borders.46 Ignoring the
warnings of post-Soviet Russian leaders47 and American
diplomats48 who foresaw the potential for a later standoff over
the matter, the first enlargement of NATO in 1999 added
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, followed by a second
expansion in 2004 that added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

42. The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle, STRATFOR GLOBAL
INTELLIGENCE
(Apr.
15,
2012,
1:47
PM),
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-russia-permanentstruggle#axzz3Oj6m0a00 (enter email address to get the full article).
43. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 82.
44. See Michael Gallagher, DeclaringVictory and Getting Out [of Europe]:

Why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Should Disband, 25 Hous. J.

INT'L L. 341, 344 (2003). In a memorable formulation, Lord Ismay, one of
NATO's first Secretaries-General, said that the alliance's purpose was "to keep
the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." See W.R.
SMYSNER, FROM YALTA To BERLIN: THE COLD WAR STRUGGLE OVER GERMANY
135 (2000).
45. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 78.
46. See Stephan Blank, Russian Policy on NATO Expansion in the Baltics,
WILSON CTR. (Jan. 27, 1998), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/151-

russian-policy-nato-expansion-the-baltics.
47. See Roger Cohen, Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern
Europe,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
2,
1993),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/world/yeltsin-opposes-expansion-of-natoin-eastern-europe.html.
48. See STROBE TALBOTT, THE RUSSIA HAND: A MEMOIR OF PRESIDENTIAL
DIPLOMACY 220 (2002) (recounting that toward the end of his life, George
Kennan, the architect of the United States' policy of containment toward the
Soviet Union in the late 1940s, warned that NATO expansion was a "strategic
blunder of potentially epic proportions").
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Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.49
Ever since the first round of NATO enlargement, U.S.
foreign policy and NATO activity have intensified Russians'
fears about the alliance. For Russians, one of the most serious
demonstrations of NATO's potential threat to Russia was the
1995 bombing campaign against Bosnian Serbs in the broader
context of the Bosnian War.50 Russian President Boris Yeltsin
warned that "[this [was] the first sign of what could happen
when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation's
borders... The flame of war could burst across the whole of
Europe."5 1 Another major flare up occurred during the Russian

occupation of Georgia in 2008. At a NATO summit that year,
U.S. President George W. Bush promised that Georgia and
Ukraine would one day enter NATO. Russian President
Vladimir Putin responded by warning that "[t~he appearance of
a powerful military bloc on our borders will be taken by Russia
as a direct threat to the security of our country."5

2

Some

observers theorized that one of the purposes of Russia's ground
invasion of Georgia in 2008 was to destabilize the country,
thereby making it ineligible for NATO membership. 3
Although the association agreement spurned by
Yanukovych in 2013 was aimed at integrating Ukraine into the
EU and not NATO, Russia perceived the prospect of Ukraine's
integration into the EU to be a stepping-stone to eventual entry
into NATO. 4 For Russian officials who have accused
proponents of EU expansion of attempting to establish a
"sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe, the one implies the
49. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 351.
50. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 78.
51. Boris Yeltsin, Yeltsin Sees War Threat in NATO Enlargement,
JAMESTOWN
FOUNDATION
(Sept.
8,
1995,
3:00
AM),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D= 10206&tx ttne

ws%5BbackPid%5D=209&no cache= I#.VDBAQtTF-cw.
52. Sebastian Alison & James G. Neuger, Russia Says NATO Expansion
is Direct Threat to Russia, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 4, 2008, 11:25 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aq34xuTFCvx0.
53. See JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34618, RUSSIA-GEORGIA
CONFLICT IN AUGUST 2008: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
11 (2009), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf ("Georgia also
appeared even less eligible by some NATO members for a Membership Action
Plan (MAP), usually considered as a prelude to membership, because of the
destruction of some of its military capabilities and the heightened insecurity of
its borders.").
54. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 79.
55. See Valentina Pop, EU Explanding Its 'Sphere of Influence,' Russia
Says,
EUOBSERVER
(Mar.
21,
2009,
4:17
PM),
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other.
Russia's fear of NATO expansion is grounded on its
historic experience with land-based invasion.56 With no natural
borders except for the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, there has been
"a deep-seated and long-standing [belief] among Russia's rulers
that
I...J the best way to deal with [the threat of invasion is]
to expand Russia's borders."57 Indeed, Russia has experienced
invasion five times over the last two centuries from its western
flank.58 Napoleon's armies entered Moscow in 1812; France and
the United Kingdom attacked Crimea in 1854; Germany
invaded during World War 1. 59 In 1921, Poland briefly occupied
and defeated the newly established Soviet Union during the
Polish-Soviet War.6 0 Finally, the Soviet Union lost millions of
its citizens under ferocious German assault from 1941 to 1945,
making the Soviet theater in World War II one of the bloodiest
in recorded history.6 ' With the exception of the 1854 AngloFrench incursion into Crimea, all these invasions came across
land. 2
With this understanding of the historic ties between
Ukraine and Russia, as well as Russia's particular fear of
NATO enlargement, it is now necessary to consider the
International Law implications of Russia's recent actions in
Ukraine. Specifically, the next section will look at which
universal norms have allegedly been violated by Russia's
annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in the
eastern part of Ukraine. The section will further consider why
the lens of realism explains Russia's willingness to violate
internationally accepted norms in the pursuit of its strategic
interests.

http://euobserver.comlforeign/27827.
56. See GEOFFREY HOSKING, RUSSIA: PEOPLE AND EMPIRE 41 (1998) ("At
all times the survival of the empire and the maintenance of its territorial
integrity were the paramount priorities for Russia's rulers, before which
national, religious, economic and other priorities invariably yielded.").
57.

See JOHN MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

190 (2003).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 127.
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III. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S
INTERVENTION IN UKRAINE: ARE THEY EVEN
PRACTICALLY SIGNIFICANT?
During the protracted crisis in eastern Ukraine, many
parties have appealed to International Law to justify their
positions before the international community. For instance,
Ukrainian authorities have pointed to widely held norms
enshrining State sovereignty to assail Russia's annexation of
Crimea and material support of rebels in its eastern territories.
Russia, on the other hand, has justified its annexation of
Crimea by reference to Crimeans' alleged right to exercise selfdetermination by voting to join Russia. Although a portion of
this discussion will note the unwillingness of the international
community to recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea, it is not
enough merely to recognize the dominant Western consensus
that Russia has violated International Law. It is also necessary
to consider the implications of such conflicting appeals to
International Law and what they say about the ability of
International Law to constrain the behavior of states in the
regulation of interstate aggression.
A. RUSSIA'S APPEAL TO THE PROTECTION OF OPPRESSED
MINORITIES AND CRIMEANS' RIGHT TO SELFDETERMINATION AS THE LEGAL BASIS OF ITS UKRAINE
POLICY

1. Yanukovych's Appeal for Russian Intervention
Russia has justified its incursion into Crimea partially by
pointing to ousted President Yanukovych's appeal to Russia for
the "use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to
establish legitimacy, peace, law and order, stability and defend
the people of Ukraine."6

3

The legal implications of a legitimate

request for foreign intervention are considerable because
International Law permits invited armed interventions only
when made by legitimate authorities in pursuit of legitimate
ends.64 One difficulty with Russia's argument, however, is that
63. Yanukovich Sent Letter to Putin Asking for Russian Military Presence
in Ukraine, RT (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:20 AM), http://rt.com/news/churkin-unscrussia-ukraine-683/.

64. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 181 (June 27); Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft
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it is not clear whether Yanukovych was vested with proper
authority when he made this appeal since he 5had at that time
been removed from office and fled the country.
There are two perspectives on the legitimacy of authority
when requesting foreign intervention.
The first is the
"effective control theory", which states that only a government
that exercises de facto control over a State's territory is
authorized to speak on behalf of that State. If, during a
rebellion or other episode of internal domestic strife, a
government is stripped of effective control over its territory, it
cannot request foreign
military
intervention.
When
Yanukovych fled Ukraine, the country was already split
between Ukrainian nationalists (particularly the so-called
Maidan demonstrators in Kiev) demanding his resignation, and
anti-Maidan demonstrators in the Russian-speaking southern
and eastern parts of the country who supported him. Because
neither side effectively controlled or represented the entire
country, neither side had the authority to invite foreign
intervention.
The second theory is the Russian-favored "popular
sovereignty theory," which states that the loss of effective
control over territory does not strip a government of its
legitimacy.6 9 Following this line of reasoning, Russia has
repeatedly
characterized
Yanukovych's
ouster
as
an
unconstitutional coup, 70 which if true would comport with
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
With Commentary, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N.

Doe. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), at 72 (art. 20).
65. See Chris Borgen, Who Speaks for Ukraine?, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 3,
2014, 8:23 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/03/who-speaks-for-ukraine/.

66. See Grigory Vaypan, (Un)Invited Guests: The Validity of Russia's
Argument on Intervention by Invitation, CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. (Mar.
5,
2014),
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/05/uninvited-guests-validity-russiasargument-intervention-invitation/.
67. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention
by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1985).
68. See Yuras Karamanau, Ukraine: Rival Groups Protest in Divided
Crimea,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
26,
2014,
7:23
AM),
http://www.usatoday.constory/news/world/2014/02/26/ukraineprotests/5829289/.
69. See Varun Baliga, Blind Spot in the Use of Force Framework - Notes
on
Crimea,
NALSAR
INT'L
L.
BLOG
(Oct.
11,
2014),
https://nalsariblog.wordpress.conV2014/10/11/blind-spot-in-the-use-of-forceframework-notes-on-crimea/.
70. See Viktor Yanukovych Was Ousted by an UnconstitutionalCoup, Said
Vladimir Putin. The EU and US Disagree., WORLD POL. J. (Mar. 4, 2014),
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recent UN General Assembly Resolutions applying the popular
sovereignty theory to cases of military coups d'etat.71 If,
however, Yanukovych's ouster was constitutionally legitimate
and the result of a loss of popular support, then Russia could
not use his previous legitimacy to legally justify his request for
intervention.72
To further justify its assertion that Yanukovych acted
under constitutional authority, Russia also argued that the
Ukrainian parliament's vote on February 22, 2014 to remove
Yanukovych from power contradicted Article 111 of the
Ukraine constitution. Article 111 states that parliament can
remove the president only "if he commits treason or some other
crime." 73 To establish treason or the commission of a crime, the
constitution calls for a review by the Constitutional Court and
also a three-fourths majority vote by parliament, which would
necessitate a quorum of 338 lawmakers, 10 more than the tally
that ultimately voted for Yanukovych's removal.74 The failure to
observe these prescribed procedures suggests that Yanukovych
was not legitimately deprived of power.
Today, however, the majority of the world recognizes the
current President, Petro Poroshenko and his government, as
the legitimate governors of Ukraine. Putin and Poroshenko
have formally met on several occasions, suggesting that
regardless of Russia's views on the procedures by which
Yanukovych was removed from office, Russia effectively
recognizes the current Ukrainian administration.m
http://worldpoliticsjournal.com/blog/2014/03/viktor-yanukovych-was-oustedby-an-unconstitutional-coup-said-vladimir-putin-the-eu-and-us-disagree/.
71. See e.g., G.A. Res. 301, U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N.
Doe. A/63/L.74 (June 30, 2009) (discussing a coup d'etat in Honduras); G.A.
Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doe. AIRES/46/7 (Oct. 11,

1991) (discussing a coup d'etat in Haiti).
72. See Institut de Droit International, Present Problems of the Use of
Force in InternationalLaw, Sub-Group C - MilitaryAssistance on Request, at
art.

3(1)

73.
FREE

See Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych's Ouster Constitutional?,RADIO
EUROPE
RADIO
LIBERTY
(Feb.
23,
2014),

(Sept.

8,

2011),

available

at

http://www.idi-

iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2011 rhodes 10 C en.pdf ("Military assistance is
prohibited . . . in particular when its object is to support an established
government against its own population.").

http ://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ousterconstitutional/25274346.html.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Cold Self-Interest, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:28 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/10/ukraine-russiagas-deal (noting that in October 2014, Russia and Ukraine signed a deal to

2015]

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

363

2. Russia's
"Responsibility
to Protect"
Russian Populations in Ukraine

Threatened

Russia has further justified its intervention in Ukraine by
claiming a right to protect Russian minorities in Crimea and
Ukraine's eastern territories who are threatened by militias,
the Ukrainian military, and general political and social
upheaval. While not explicitly referencing the so-called
"responsibility to protect" principle (or "R2P") to justify its
intervention on humanitarian grounds, the rhetoric of Russian
leaders seems to mirror it. The Speaker of the Russian Duma
related that Putin has been authorized to "use all available
means to protect the people of Crimea from tyranny and
violence," while Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pronounced
that "we are talking here about protection of our citizens and
compatriots, about protection of the most fundamental of the
human rights."76
R2P is an evolving legal concept that emerged in the postCold War era as a response to a number of international
humanitarian
crises.77 Under
R2P,
the
international
community is thought to have a responsibility to actively
prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing,
and genocide through military intervention if an offending
State is unable or unwilling to stop atrocities. 8 Russia has
ironically often opposed American humanitarian interventions
and challenged their legality under International Law,
claiming that they violate the principle of State sovereignty
and are cynical pretexts for advancing America's geostrategic
interests.79 However, Russia notably referenced R2P to
80
partially justify its 2008 invasion of South Ossetia in Georgia.
resume shipments of natural gas to Ukraine in time for winter).
76. Mark Kersten, Does Russia Have a 'Responsibility to Protect' Ukraine?
Don't Buy It, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 4, 2014, 12:59 PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.comnglobe-debate/does-russia-have-aresponsibility-to-protect-ukraine-dont-buy-it/articlel7271450/.
77. See generally Halil Rahman Basaran, Identifying the Responsibility to
Protect, 38 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 195 (2014).
78. Id.
79. Non-Interference

on

the

Line,

ECONOMIST

(Mar.

15,

2014),

http://www.economist.conmnews/china/21599035-crisis-ukraine-uncovers-holeheart-chinese-foreign-policy-non-interference.
80. See Gareth Evans, Russia, Georgia,and the Responsibility to Protect, 1
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During that conflict, Foreign Minister Lavrov expounded at
some length on Russia's legal and moral obligation to protect
threatened Russians in the northwestern parts of Georgia:
[U]nder the Constitution [the President] is obliged to
protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens,
especially when they find themselves in the armed
conflict. And today he reiterated that the peace
enforcement operation enforcing peace on one of the
parties which violated its own obligations would
continue until we achieve the results. According to our
Constitution there is also responsibility to protect - the
term which is very widely used in the UN when people
see some trouble in Africa or in any remote part of other
regions ... This is the area where Russian citizens live.
So the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws
of the
Russian Federation make
it
absolutely
81
unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to protect.
As with the 2008 conflict in Georgia, however, Russia and
Ukraine vehemently disputed the existence and scope of
human rights violations that would legally sanction foreign
humanitarian intervention. The Ukrainian Association of
International Law, for instance, totally rejected the Russian
position:
[... J no duly authorized national, foreign or
international institution has declared any violation of
human rights on the territory of Ukraine, or specifically
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which would
have required the intervention of any subject of
international law or the international community.82
The Russian Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, has
published a comprehensive White Book chronicling what it
concluded are extensive human rights violations in Ukraine.83
AMSTERDAM

L.F.,

no.

2,

2009,

at

25,

25,

available

at

http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/58/86.
81. Id.
82. An Appeal from the Ukrainian Association of International Law,
EUROMAIDAN

PRESS

(Mar.

3,

2014),

http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/03/an-appeal-from-the-ukrainianassociation-of-international-law/.
83. See Russian Foreign Ministry Presents White Book on Human Rights
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Putin recently highlighted these violations
comments about the situation in Ukraine:

365
in

pointed

In the southeast of [Ukraine], people are killed, there is
a real humanitarian disaster going on, tens of
thousands of refugees are forced to seek shelter,
including in Russia. Journalists die performing their
professional duties. In violation of all international
norms and conventions, diplomats are attacked, as was
in the case of the attack on the Russian Embassy in
Kiev and the Consulate General in Odessa. 4
At first glance, these starkly contrasting assessments of
the humanitarian situation in Ukraine might reflect a mere
difference of opinions, but in practice they readily highlight the
difficulty of defining and applying international norms to
concrete situations when adversarial geopolitical interests are
at stake.85
There are also conflicting views on the legality of
humanitarian intervention itself.86 Although there appears to
be consensus that humanitarian intervention is "legal" when
sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, there is not
widespread agreement among states on intervention in the
absence of U.N. Security Council authorization. Historically,
this disagreement has been most pronounced between
democratic powers and developing states. "Large numbers of
post-colonial states, particularly in Africa and Asia, have
opposed, and continue to oppose, the principle of humanitarian
intervention. Many such states see themselves as vulnerable to
foreign intervention, and are understandably sensitive about
threats to their sovereignty. In some cases other and less
creditable considerations are involved: many an oppressive
regime would like to stop the emergence of a new norm that
Abuses in
Ukraine, TASS
tass.conmen/russia/730463.

(May

5,

2014,

1:34

PM),

http://itar-

84. USA Pushed Ukrainians to Split, Putin Says, PRAVDA.RU (June 27,
2014),
http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/27-06-2014/127911ukrainians usa putin-0/#.VFKYrWTF8i4.
85. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw,
InternationalRelations and Compliance, in WALTER CARLSNAES ET AL., THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 538 (2002) ("Disagreement
over the effect of international commitments and the causes of compliance
with them is equally persistent.").
86. See Sean Murphy, CriminalizingHumanitarianIntervention, 41 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 341, 344-52 (2009).
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could upset the monopoly of power within the State."87 Thus the
inconsistent practice of states as well as ongoing dispute about
the ultimate legality of intervention on humanitarian grounds
has complicated the legal paradigm of Russia's intervention in
Ukraine.
Russia's insistence that it has a responsibility to protect
threatened ethnic Russians in Ukraine's eastern territories and
Crimea may at first glance appear to be nothing more than a
cynical manipulation of a still-evolving international norm to
pursue broader strategic objectives under the guise of legality.
However, it also reveals a fundamental weakness inherent in
attempting to institutionalize international norms: there is no
overarching authority responsible for the development or
enforcement of International Law.88 Concepts such as R2P are
therefore subject to cynical manipulation by any State
regardless of that State's conformity with the perceptions and
assumptions of other members of the international community.
3. Did Crimea Have a Right to Secede from Ukraine?
Crimea has been an object of conquest since the classical
era.89 Ancient Greeks, ancient Romans, the Byzantine Empire,
and the Ottoman Empire inhabited its southern portion, while
numerous peoples, including the Golden Horde, inhabited its
interior. 90 Crimea was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the
late 1 8 th century and remained a Russian territory until 1954
when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a gift from the Russian
people. 91 Recent data shows that "more than 76% of the
population of Crimea sees Russian as its native language and
93% of the children are educated in Russian-language schools."

87.

See Adam

Intervention,

in

Roberts,

The

HUMANITARIAN

United Nations
INTERVENTION

and
AND

Humanitarian
INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS 88 (Jennifer M. Walsh ed., 2004).
88. See Ruti Teitel, A Cornerstoneof InternationalLaw-and An Obstacle
to
Protecting
Citizens,
LEGAL
AFF.,
Sept./Oct.
2002,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October2002/feature teitel sepoct2002.msp.
89. See, e.g., Todd B. Krause & Jonathan Slocum, Gothic Wanderings,
401-418, LINGUSTIC RES. CTR., U. TEX. AUSTIN, COLL. LIBERAL ARTS,
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/lrc/eieol/gotol- 10-R.html.
90. Crimea,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(Mar.
20,
2014),
http://www.britannica.comEBchecked/topic/143010/Crimea/31488l/History.
91. Id.
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92

These historical details are relevant to a thorough
understanding of why Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Russia
has attempted to ground its annexation in legal norms by
pointing to the right of Crimeans to exercise self-determination
and secede from Ukraine, which they purported to do in a
disputed referendum on March 16, 2014. The official final vote,
with an alleged turnout of over 80%, counted 96.77% of
Crimeans and 95.60% of Sevastopol residents voting to join
Russia. 93 Ukraine vehemently disputes the legality (as well as

the procedural integrity) 94 of the vote and denies that it was a
legitimate exercise of self-determination.
Self-determination is deeply embedded in the UN
Charter.5 One of the proclaimed purposes of the UN's existence
was to elevate self-determination as a fundamental political
and moral value, thereby linking it to the goal of promoting
constructive and peaceful relations among states in the
aftermath of World War 11.96 Additionally, Article I of both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights states that "[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."97 Finally, the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights Article 15 declares that all people
have a right to a nationality and that no one can be deprived of
98
a nationality or denied the right to change their nationality.
92. Aneta Pavlenko, Russian in Post-Soviet, 32 Russ. LINGUISTICS 59, 61
(2008),
available
at
http://astro.temple.edu/-apavlenk/pdf/Russian Linguistics 2008.pdf.
93. Crimea Declares Independence, Seeks UN Recognition, RT (Mar. 17,
2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.rt.com/news/crimea-referendum-results-official250/.
94. Ukraine Crisis: 'Illegal' Crimean Referendum Condemned, BBC (Mar.

6, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26475508.
95.

Self

Determination (International Law),

LEGAL

INFO.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self determination international law.

INST.,

96. STEFAN OETER, Self-Determination, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 313, 319 (3rd ed. 2012), available at
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780199639762.001.000 1/law9780199639762-part- 14#law-9780199639762-div3-36.
97. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doe. AIRES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), at
49
(art.
1),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200(XXI).
98. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doe. A/RES/217(III)(Dec. 10, 1948), at 74 (art. 15).
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Self-determination is thus one of the few rights that are
presently thought to be peremptory in nature - i.e., a principle
universally accepted by the international community from
which there can be no derogation. 99
There are two problems with the current concept of selfdetermination that are starkly illuminated by Russia's
annexation of Crimea on the supposed grounds of Crimeans'
right to self-determination. The first is that International Law
has not defined clearly what a "people" is, thus casting doubt
on whether this right can apply to residents of Crimea.'00 The
second is that the concept of self-determination, particularly
when construed as an argument for secession, contradicts
another fundamental international norm: the right of a State to
preserve its territorial integrity.'0 '
There is no recognized right to secede under International
Law. 0 2 Neither the UN Charter nor any major international

covenant confers an unfettered right of secession to any State's
inhabitants.'0 3 Judicial opinions about referenda debates have
been inconclusive. For example, when it was asked to analyze
Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, the
International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's secession did
not strictly violate International Law because general
International Law does not contain a prohibition on
declarations of independence, but it also did not positively
affirm its legality. 0 4 Looking broadly at the practice of States,
99.

See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75

(2004).
100. See
generally
Vita Gudeleviciute,
Does the Principleof SelfDeterminationPrevail over the Principle of TerritorialIntegrity?, INT'L J.
BALTIC

L.,

Apr.

2005,

available

http://www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2009/10/Gudeleviciute.pdf.

at

101. Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, TerritorialIntegrity,

and

the Right to Secession 9 (U.S. Inst. Peace, Peacework No. 7, 1996), available at

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks7.pdf.
102. Chris Borgen, Can Crimea Secede by Referendum?, OPINIO JURIS
(Mar. 6, 2014, 3:27 PM),

http://opiniojuris.org/2014103/06/can-crimea-secede-referendunm.
103. Roya M. Hanna, Right to Self-Determination in In Re Secession of
Quebec, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. 213, 230 (1999).

104. See Accordance with InternationalLaw of the Unilateral Declaration

of Independence in Respect of Kosovo: Summary of the Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
(July 22, 2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf,
Heiko
Krueger, Was Kosovo's Split-Off Legitimate? Background, Meaning and
Implications of the ICJ'sAdvisory Opinion, 4 CAUCASIAN REV. INT'L AFF. 293,

294 (2010) ("Does that mean that the ICJ recognized the legality of Kosovo's
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the
international
community
tends
not to sanction
independence referenda that are conducted in contravention to
a State's internal laws. Since 1945, the United Nations has not
recognized a single State created by unilateral secession
"against the declared wishes of the government of the
predecessor State.""° It is more often the case that unilateral
attempts at secession fail even when there is de facto
independence, 0 6 and so there is very limited historical practice
to justify codifying secession as a right.
[Tihere have been hundreds of peacefully resolved selfdetermination claims over the past decades, and the
accumulating body of law and precedent they have
created has set a fairly high, if uncodified, threshold for
establishing the legitimacy of secessionist claims: A
group of people in a defined territory must have
distinctive identity and a history of persecution at the
hands of an unresponsive state that has made it
impossible for them to effectively exercise the right to
internal self-determination. 107
Ukraine has repeatedly emphasized that it did not grant
Crimea a right to conduct an independence referendum and
that the vote violated Ukraine's constitution. Moreover, in spite
of Russia's insistence that Crimean residents were denied the
right to order their local affairs by the government in Kiev,
Crimea's constitutional status within Ukraine arguably
already was a solution to their autonomy-related grievances:
Between 1991 and 1998, Crimea's
negotiated the status of their
Ukraine, resulting in the creation
Republic of Crimea," whose rights

leaders laboriously
relationship with
of an "Autonomous
were spelled out in

independence? No. Unlike many press reports suggest, the ICJ explicitly made

clear that it did not handle the question of the legal consequences of the
declaration of independence. But this would have been the crucial question.
Without an answer to that question, the ICJ could not clear up Kosovo's legal
status.").
105.

JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

390 (2nd ed. 2007).
106. Id.
107. Brad Simpson, Self-Determination in the Age of Putin, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Mar.
21,
2014),

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/21/self determination in the a
ge of putin crimea referendum.
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both the Ukrainian and Crimean constitutions. It was a
textbook example of the peaceful resolution of a claim to
self-determination - which just a few decades earlier
might have resulted in violent conflict, and a sobering
counterpoint1 8to the bloody disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia.

0

Russia has conversely hailed the Crimean independence
vote as an exercise in self-determination and argued that the
international practice of States, particularly in the fairly recent
case of Kosovo, legally sanctions the result. Many international
scholars and observers nevertheless reject Russia's comparison
of Crimea to Kosovo. Kosovo voted to secede from Serbia in
2008 following years of brutal repression by the Yugoslav army,
which led to NATO's bombing campaign in 1999. According to
Neil Melvin of the Stockholm International Peace Institute,
"[tihere was extensive and systematic discrimination and
violation of human rights in Kosovo. This created the main
legal basis for an international intervention and the
declaration of independence. However, with Crimea, there
really is no humanitarian crisis despite the claims advanced by
Russia."01 9 Also, unlike the case of Kosovo, the international
community's recognition of Crimea's referendum has been very
limited. Only 14 UN member States have recognized it. In
contrast, as of August 2014, 108 UN member States have
recognized Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia.

°

Thus Russia's annexation of Crimea on the questionable
grounds of Crimean self-determination - much like Russia's
self-identified humanitarian responsibility to protect oppressed
minorities in Crimea and the eastern territories of Ukraine - is
likely nothing but a cynical cover for the pursuit of strategic
interests in the region. The challenging interplay between
State sovereignty and self-determination - both recognized as
fundamental norms in the international system - has arguably
created a situation in which Russia has been able to exploit
unclear international legal norms to achieve broader
108. Id.
109. Experts: Crimea Isn't Comparable to Kosovo, ANADOLU ANGENCY
(Mar. 17, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/302263--experts-

crimea-isnt-comparable-to-kosovo.
110. Solomon Islands Recognize Kosovo's Independence, KOSOVAR
MINISTRY OF INDEPENDENCE, accessed March 8, 2015, available at
http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,2415&offset=1 (noting that Solomon brought
the number of States recognizing Kosovo to 108).
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geopolitical objectives.

B. UKRAINE'S APPEAL TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A LEGAL
DEFENSE AGAINST RUSSIA'S INTERVENTION

In addition to rejecting Russia's asserted responsibility to
protect threatened Russians, as well as Crimeans' right to
unilateral secession, Ukraine has staunchly opposed Russia's
intervention within its territory by appealing to another
foundational international norm: State sovereignty and the
impermissibility of intervening in the internal affairs of other
States. Ukraine argues that Russia has violated Ukrainian
sovereignty by annexing a portion of its territory and also by
offering financial and logistical assistance to rebels in the
eastern part of the country. Russia's response (which, again,
has been accused of being nothing more than cynical
manipulation by some observers)"' is an elaboration of its
asserted responsibility to protect threatened populations in
Ukraine: The once absolute concept of State sovereignty has
necessarily evolved to permit interventions on humanitarian
grounds, which if true, could shield Russia from accusations
that it has impermissibly violated the sovereignty of Ukraine.
1. The Principle of State Sovereignty

There is arguably no more important norm underpinning
modern international relations than the concept of State
sovereignty. 1 2 The reason for this goes to the very foundation of
international relations:
[Sovereignty]
defines
nationhood.
It
underlies
international law's requirement of state consent to
treaties and customary international law. And it
explains why nations respect territorial borders, confer
and deny recognition, and honor diplomatic immunity.
In these and many other contexts, national sovereignty
is among the most robust of international legal
111. Interfax-Ukraine, Putin: West's position on Crimea cynical, KYIV POST
(Mar. 18, 2014, 5:32 PM), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/putinwests-position-on-crimea-cynical-339860.html.
112. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: InternationalLaw,
ConstitutionalLaw, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1843 (2009).
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principles, exercising a powerful influence on national
behaviors." 3
The modern concept of State sovereignty is commonly
thought to have originated with the Peace of Westphalia, an
historical event which arguably marked the birth of the modern
State."4
Sovereignty
assigns
States
three
crucial
characteristics: (1) jurisdiction over their own territories and
permanent populations; (2) the duty not to intervene in the
exclusive jurisdiction of other States; and (3) the dependence of
obligations which emerge from the sources of International
Law. 5 The Peace of Westphalia, which describes several peace
treaties signed between May and October 1648 ending the
Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in the Holy Roman Empire and
the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) between Spain and the
Dutch Republic, molded a new international political order
based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign States."6 Under
this order, interstate aggression would be moderated by a
balance of power in which States endeavor to ensure that no
actor within the international system wields an excessive
measure of power that could upset the equilibrium." 7 The
Westphalian order introduced "prejudice" against interference
in other States' internal affairs." 8
The concept of State sovereignty thus became a crucial new
instrument to regulate interstate aggression. Specific efforts to
preserve the balance of power envisaged by Westphalia
included the European concert of powers against Napoleon, as
well as the Treaty of Vienna following the Napoleonic Wars

113. See Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, InternationalRelations Theory, and
InternationalLaw, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959,959 (2000).
114. See PETER H. WILSON, EUROPE'S TRAGEDY: A HISTORY OF THE THIRTY

YEARS WAR 754 (2009) ("The [dominant] interpretation of Westphalia regards

it as the birth of the modern international order based on sovereign states
interacting (formally) as equals within a common secularized legal framework,

regardless of size, power or internal configuration.").
115. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 15

(1st ed. 1966).

116. Jeffrey D. Martino, At the Edge of the State: Indigeneous Peoples and
Self-Determination, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 103, 104 (2001).
117. See KISSINGER, supra note 22, at 2 ("The Westphalian peace reflected

a practical accommodation to reality, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a
system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's
domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general
equilibrium of power.").

118. Id.
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that cemented Westphalian notions of balance and sovereignty
for nearly a century before the outbreak of World War I. 119 To
this day, despite numerous global wars and political upheavals
that have radically changed (and increased) the body of States
operating within the international system, State sovereignty
remains a foundational norm. 2" Even Article 2 of the relatively
recent United Nations Charter proclaims that the organization
"is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members,"' 2' that "la]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state,"22 and that "[n]othing contained in the... Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 23
Despite these strong historical underpinnings, some
scholars and observers think that the concept of State
sovereignty has been steadily eroding. 124 Following World War
I, a number of treaties and institutions challenged the
absolutism of State sovereignty by recognizing a need to protect
vulnerable
populations
threatened
by,
for
instance,
humanitarian disaster. 2 5 Although the end of World War II
paved the way to a protracted Great Power standoff between
the United States and the Soviet Union during which
Westphalian concepts of State sovereignty and balance of
power were central to international affairs, the proliferation of
numerous human rights treaties 26 elevated rights-based norms

119. Id. at 29.
120. See MICHAEL STRUETT, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGOS, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 168

(2008).
121. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
122. Id. at para. 4.
123. Id. at para. 7.

124. See William Magnuson, The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline
of Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under InternationalLaw, 43 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 255,257 (2010).

125. See David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority
Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 599-600 (1997) (noting that following World

War I concerns about the rights of minority groups "dominated the
international legal agenda").
126. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (Dec. 16,

1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 98.
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to new heights of legal expression. 127 A long succession of
thinkers, including some as early as Prussian philosopher
Immanuel Kant, have envisioned the establishment of a
community of nations to regulate competitive interstate
relations by subordinating sovereignty to law. 128 For much of
history, however, the political and military realities of29
international relations made this goal unattainable.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, a new
approach to international order seemed to emerge. A series of
humanitarian interventions in conflict areas such as Kosovo
and Somalia -unthinkable during the Cold War' 30 - challenged
the absolutism of State sovereignty by crystalizing a new legal
paradigm of intervention in the internal affairs of other States
to prevent genocide and other serious human rights
violations.' 3'
The recent evolution of State sovereignty thus offers both
challenges and opportunities for proponents of heightened
international intervention in humanitarian crises. On one
hand, mobilizing States to intervene in humanitarian crises is
more possible now than ever before, not only because the
geopolitical restraints of the Cold War have evaporated, but
also because there has been a concerted popular and legal push
to sanction such interventions. On the other hand, the nonabsolute nature of State sovereignty potentially exposes weaker
States to the cynical exploitation of this principle. While
historically a backer of strong State sovereignty, Russia now
127.
128.
(1795),
129.

See BROWNLIE, supra note 115.
See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch
available at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kantl.htm.
See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, NAT'L INT., Summer 1989

("The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of
ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of
absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism
that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war."), available
at http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm.
130.

See IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL

LAW, POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS 59 (2011) ("The five permanent members

of the [Security Council] have been dealing with each other on an almost daily
basis for the last 20 years, in effect, debating the shape of the post-Cold War
world in the context of particular crises and on occasion thematic issues (such
as the protection of civilians in armed conflict). From northern Iraq, through
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Afghanistan,
collectively they have found a way of authorizing - or endorsing after the fact
- operations that could have been unthinkable during the Cold War.").
131. See supra pp. 113-16 (discussion on Responsibility to Protect).

2015]

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

375

argues that it has a legal obligation to protect threatened
Russians in Ukraine partly on the basis of weakened norms
governing State sovereignty.
2. Russia Has Likely Violated Ukraine's Sovereignty by
Supporting Pro-Russian Separatists
Russia steadfastly and consistently denies that it has
violated Ukraine's sovereignty. 3 2 In public comments on the
ongoing crisis, Russian leaders have taken care to emphasize
that their conduct has been grounded in respect for Ukraine's
sovereignty and the right of its democratically-elected leaders
to conduct Ukraine's foreign policy without external
interference, including signing an association agreement with
the EU. 133 With regard to Crimea, Putin rejects rhetoric
suggesting that Russia "annexed" the peninsula by pointing out
that Russian troops were already deployed on a Russian
military base in Crimea regulated by a treaty between the two
countries. Furthermore, Putin argues that International Law
demands respect for Crimeans' right to self-determination
under the UN Charter, a right which he claims a majority of
Crimeans exercised during the peninsula's
referendum to make
34
clear their desire to join Russia.
The difficulties with Russia's arguments about Crimeans'
right to secession have already been discussed. With regard to
accusations that Russia has stationed troops in the eastern
part of Ukraine and provided financial and logistic support to
pro-Russian rebels, Russia has arguably been even less
successful in warding off Western accusations of violating
Ukrainian sovereignty. In a June 2014 interview, Putin
insisted that "there are no armed forces, no Russian
'instructors' in southeastern Ukraine, and there never were
any."' 3 However, for months NATO, American, and other
132. Reuters & The Associated Press, Russia Denies Reports That It
Invaded
Ukraine,
HAARETZ
(Aug.
28,
2014,
7:55
PM),

http://www.haaretz.conmnews/world/1.612981.
133. Lavrov: Russia won't sanction if Kiev Signs EU Deal, RT (Jun. 10,
2014, 12:20 PM), http://rt.com/news/165080-lavrov-ukraine-association-eu/.

134. Putin Says Crimea Referendum No Breach of International Law,
HERALD (Harare) (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.herald.co.zw/putin-says-crimea-

referendum-no-breach-of-international-law/.
135. Russia Never Annexed Crimea,No plans to intervene in Ukraine, It's a
Western delusion - Putin, VOICE OF RUSSIA (June 5, 2014, 11:01 AM),
http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014 06 05/Russia-never-annexed-Crimea-no-
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countries' intelligence communities, as well as a wide array of
private observers, have provided extensive evidence of Russian
troops and equipment operating in eastern Ukraine. 36 This
evidence includes video documentation of Russian troop
movement, photographs, testimony of Russian soldiers, 37 local
eyewitness accounts, R and satellite imagery.' 9 Despite ongoing
vehement Russian denials, the evidence collectively suggests
that Russia has indeed supported pro-Russian separatists.
Moreover, at one point approximately 20,000 Russian troops
140
were amassed on Russia's border with Ukraine.
There are numerous theories about why Russia has been
providing extensive support to separatist rebels in Ukraine.
For a period of time, there was fear that Russia intended to
annex eastern portions of Ukraine. 4' Another theory held that
Russia hoped to carve a land route from Russia to the newly
annexed Crimean peninsula. 42 Finally, other observers have
suggested that Russia has no specific intention to annex any
more Ukrainian territory, but by supporting rebels and
fomenting an ongoing military and humanitarian crisis in the
eastern part of the country, will be able to keep Ukraine
enmeshed in a "frozen conflict" that will prevent the country's
admission into either the EU or NATO. 43
plans-to-intervene-Ukraine-its-Western-delusion-Putin-5970/.
136. See, e.g., Moscow Slams NATO's Accusations of Invasion in Ukraine as
Groundless, RT (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://rt.conmnews/204895-russia-

ukraine-military-nato/.
137. Alexander Prohanov, Who Are you, "Shooter?",ZAVTRA (Nov. 20, 2014)
http://zavtra.ru/content/view/kto-tyi-strelok/ (interviewing soldiers about their
experiences).
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2014,
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142. Benny Avni, All Is Not Well on Ukraine's Eastern Front, NEWSWEEK
(Nov.

17, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/all-not-well-ukraines-

eastern-front-284894.
143. Svante E. Cornell, Crimea and the Lessons of Frozen Conflicts, AM.
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The glaring disconnect between extensive evidence
chronicling Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and the
rhetoric employed by Russian leaders to deny this intervention
suggests that, despite its repeated appeals to International
Law norms throughout the crisis, Russia knows that its
material support of pro-Russian separatists cannot be
reconciled with International Law norms. Accordingly, a policy
of absolute denial is the only feasible approach that Russia can
take to maintain face and to operate with a degree of
operational flexibility. At this stage, then, it is necessary to
consider why Russia would continue to take steps that are so at
odds with International Law norms while simultaneously
pledging respect for those same norms.
C. REALISM'S EMPHASIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
POWER AND SECURITY EXPLAINS WHY INTERNATIONAL
LAW WILL NOT CONSTRAIN RUSSIA
There is no consensus among scholars of international

relations or practitioners of statecraft about the utility or value
of International Law as an instrument of regulating interstate
relations. 4 4 Proponents of realism in particular tend to dismiss
outright any significant role International law might play in45
affecting the behavior of States in the international system.
This section will consider the theoretical assumptions of
realism, the views of some realist scholars on International
Law, and why these views explain, with considerable success,
why Russia has been willing to violate International Law
norms to pursue its interests in Ukraine.
1. Realist Assumptions about the Anarchical Nature of the
International System and the Role of International Law
Although there are several strands of realist thought, all
and now to Ukraine-is the same: If they go West, Russia will dismember
them and prevent them from regaining their sovereignty.").
144. See, e.g., David Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force
in the Reagan Years, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 75 (1994) (discussing
contrasting perspectives among international relations scholars on the utility

of international law).

145. See id. at 72-73. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International

Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
205, 206 (1993).
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realists agree that there is an inseparable link between
security and power. 146 Classical realism, whose origins extend
as far back as the Greek historian Thucydides' famed account
of the Second Peloponnesian War, emphasizes humans'
unalterable lust for power as the eternal root of military
conflict. 4 7 In more modern times, Hans Morgenthau brought
classical realism into the twentieth century by incorporating
pessimistic assumptions about human psychology into his
analysis of contemporary international relations. 4 8
Structural realism is a more recent variation of this
theoretical perspective. In his 1979 seminal work "Theory of
International Politics," Kenneth Waltz deemphasizes the
psychological roots of interstate competition and instead
elevates the significance of the anarchical structure of the
international system. 149 In an anarchical international system,
no centralized power exercises domination over individual
States. 5 0 Every State must pursue its survival by means of selfhelp, because those that fail to do so will expose themselves to
mortal danger.' 5 ' On this point, however, there is disagreement
with yet another strand of realism. Offensive realism,
developed by John Mearsheimer, disagrees with structural
realists about the reasons why States pursue power. 5 2 Whereas
structural realists believe that the pursuit of hegemony in an
anarchical system is a misguided and dangerous goal, offensive
realists believe that States will inevitably attempt to gain as
much power as they possibly can because only by attaining a
position of hegemony - or something
close to it - can a State
5 3
1
ensure its security and survival.

146. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1789, 1793 (2003).
147. See id. at 1793-96.
148. See id.
149. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1979).
150. Id.
151. John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 71, 74 (Tim Dunne, Milja
Kurki,
&
Steve
Smith
eds.,
2006),
available
at

http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf ("Fearful of other
states, and knowing that they operate in a self-help world, states quickly
realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful. The reasoning
here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its
competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked.").
152. See generally id.
153. Id. at 72.
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Realism is predicated on at least five assumptions about
the international system that explain in part why States
engage in conflict with each other. 5 4 The first, according to
Mearsheimer, is that "great powers" are the principal actors in
world politics.

55

The second is that all states possess some

offensive military capability by which they can inflict harm to
others. The third is that States are perpetually uncertain
about the intentions of other States, i.e., they cannot know
which States intend to use force to alter the balance of power in
the international system and which States don't want to
change it. 5 7 The fourth is that the main goal of States is to

survive by preserving their territorial integrity and operating
without external interference. The final assumption is that
States are rational actors that devise and execute strategies in
the pursuit of policies that will ensure their survival. 19When
these assumptions interact with one another and are assessed
against the backdrop of history, they possess a great deal of
explanatory power with regard to the competitive nature of
international relations.
Realists also emphasize that the basic unit of currency in
the international system is power. 16 0 Because of the chronic
uncertainty about other States' long-term intentions as well as
the inability to appeal to higher powers for help in the event of
attack, States tend to seek to accumulate power both as a
deterrent to attack and as a means of fighting off attacks in
progress.
Power, in more subtle ways, may shape global
events and form alliances, which affect a State's security vis-kvis others. But the unregulated exercise of raw power stands in
opposition to recent attempts to establish legal norms
regulating international conflict and the use of force. The
question now is what role International Law plays in a world
characterized by the realist assumptions noted here.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id.

160. See generally David Baldwin, Power and InternationalRelations, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS 273, 273-75 (Walter Carlsnes,

Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2013).
161. See Peter Toft, John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between
Geopolitics and Power, 8 J. INT'L REL. & DEV. 381, 383 (2005), available at

http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html.
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According to virtually all strands of realism, International
Law plays no significant role in alleviating the basic structural
conditions that infuse conflict and the lust for power into the
international system. 16 2 To the extent that the rhetoric of
International Law permeates public discourse and consumes
the attention of States, realism contends that International
Law is a cynical tool by which States pursue their own
interests. In other words, if a State concludes that complying
with a provision of International Law - or insisting that other
States comply with International Law - is consistent with its
individual interests, then it will claim to be bound by
International Law and act accordingly. However, if a State
concludes that disregarding a provision of International Law is
a means by which it can achieve security vis-a-vis other States,
then it will freely do so.
Liberalism is an international relations theory that
emphasizes institutions and domestic and transnational civil
society as key variables in shaping international behavior. 16 3
One of liberalism's aims is the establishment of "a body of rules
regulating transnational society that will foster the creation of
transnational patterns of interest likely to shape State
action."16 4 Its proponents reject realism's bleak assessment of
International Law by pointing to the myriad of organizations,
treaties, and tribunals to which States voluntarily submit
themselves. 6 5 In the age-old debate about the utility of
International Law, liberals find persuasive value in the many
instances of States altering their behavior and internal policies,
or relinquishing part of their sovereignty, under the framework
of norms, treaties, and international institutions.
Realists
respond to this by raising examples of States that fail to comply
with international norms, withdraw from treaties when
162. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2616 (1997) ("International relations scholars,

suffused with realism, treated international law as naive and virtually

beneath discussion.").

163. See Burley, supra note 145, at 228.
164. Id. at 232.
165. See generally John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International
Institutions, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 5, 15-26, available at
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0021.pdf. See also Burley, supra note

145, at 207 ("Liberals focus not on state-to-state interactions, at least not in
the first instance, but on an analytically prior set of relationships among
states and domestic and transnational civil society.").
166. See Mearsheimer, supra note 165, at 18 (discussing how contracting
and creating rules may affect a State's behavior).
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convenient, disregard UN Security Council resolutions, and
engage in activities banned by multilateral treaties. 16 7 Despite
optimism that the post-Cold War period would lead to greater
enthusiasm for international norms and institutions, realists
conclude that States are selective in applying norms that suit
their interests l s If one adopts the foundational assumptions of
realism, this conclusion is inescapable: there is no higher power
that can compel a State chronically uncertain about its security
to comply with a norm that is widely thought to carry the force
of law. So if a State concludes that following a particular norm
would expose it to exploitation by other States or minimize its
existing power, then it has every incentive to disregard that
norm.
2. International Law Has Failed to Constrain Russian
Incursions Against Ukraine's Sovereignty
Even if one extends to Russia the widest possible benefit of
the doubt about its claims and defenses in the context of the
crisis in Ukraine, it is astonishingly difficult to reconcile all of
its actions in Ukraine with International Law. Moreover, if
Western critics' bleak assessments about Russia's behavior are
accurate, then Russia has indeed violated International Law.
While this is disturbing to International Law scholars and
activists who envision legal norms as the means by which
States should achieve sustained cooperation with each other in
an increasingly interconnected world, this is not surprising at
all if one considers Russia's geopolitical position vis-a-vis
NATO and understands what the loss of influence over Ukraine
would mean for Russia's conception of its own security. In other
words, realism explains and has virtually predicted the crisis in
Ukraine.
As discussed, Russia views Ukraine as an integral
component of its patrimony, a vital geographic buffer zone
between its vast territory and the menacing threat of the West,
and a manifestation of its power and influence in what Russia
refers to as "the Near Abroad." 6

9

The collapse of the Soviet

167. See id. at 33 (providing a number of historical examples in which
States' actions were not in compliance with international norms).
168. See generally id.
169. Robert Kagan, New Europe, Old Russia, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502879.html.
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Union in 1991 greatly weakened Russian power not only by
diminishing Russia's territorial landmass, its ability to project
power abroad, and its total national wealth and population, but
also by pitting itself against the "victorious" NATO alliance.
The enduring threat of nuclear war continues to make it
virtually inconceivable that the West would ever directly attack
Russia, but NATO expansion has instilled in Russia a fear that
the US-led security alliance will take advantage of its relative
17
strength by constraining, intimidating, or bullying Russia.
The NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999 confirmed Russia's
worst fears that NATO would pursue regional objectives that
are at odds with Russian interests. 72
Russia's post-1990 efforts to integrate itself into
international institutions, adopt and apply the rhetoric of legal
norms, and commit itself to constructive cooperation with the
West comport entirely with realism's maxim that States
ultimately pursue ends that align with their interests. 73 For
instance, after enduring considerable economic degradation in
the 1990s, Russia began to take steps to enter the WTO as a
way of penetrating new global markets, importing competitive
technologies, and stimulating its weak domestic economy.174
Fast-forwarding to a very different situation in 2015, Russia
has not been dissuaded from intervening in Ukraine by the
threat and subsequent imposition of Western economic
sanctions. 75 At first glance, this appears to undermine Russia's
long-held goal of modernizing and growing its moribund
economy. It strongly suggests, however, that retaining
influence over Ukraine occupies a place of prominence in
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174. See id. at 825-27.
175. See David R. Cameron, Sanctions Will Not Deter Russia, Concerned
about Its Security Interests in Ukraine, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (May 1, 2014),
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Russia's conception of its security to such an extent that it is
willing to damage its relationship with the West, suffer
economic harm, and violate a myriad of legal norms.
Although Western leaders reacted to Russia's intervention
in Ukraine with outward bafflement, 76 Putin has long been
open about the underlying rationale of his policy and why
Russia came to perceive internal political developments in
Ukraine as a threat to Russia's interests. When asked to
comment in an interview about some Ukrainians' desire to
enter NATO, Putin responded: "This is what worries us,
because if Ukraine joins ... NATO, NATO's infrastructure will
move directly towards the Russian border, which cannot leave
us indifferent." 177 While discussing his repeated attempts to
diffuse the situation in Ukraine through diplomatic channels,
Putin also made clear his view regarding the relationship
between the prospect of Ukraine's theoretical eventual
admission into NATO and Russia's annexation of Crimea:
In response to our attempts to hold.., dialogue...
[,][the West] supported the anti-constitutional state
coup in Ukraine, and following that we could not be
sure that Ukraine would not become part of the North
Atlantic military bloc. In that situation, we could not
allow a historical part of the Russian territory with a
predominantly ethnic Russian population to be
incorporated into an international military alliance,
especially because Crimeans wanted to be part
of
78
Russia. I am sorry, but we couldn't act differently.
Although Russia has engaged in smokescreen tactics to
conceal the full extent of its engagement with Ukraine's proRussian separatists,17 9 it has made no attempt to downplay or
hide its overriding strategic objectives in Ukraine. Ever since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently
viewed NATO as a strategic threat. Furthermore, Russia does
not trust American and Western overtures about promoting
democratization in Ukraine, instead viewing Western policy in
Ukraine as a cynical ploy to extend American power
176. Alexander Kudascheff, Opinion: The West baffled, DEUSTCHE WELLE
(Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.dw.de/opinion-the-west-baffled/a-17889604.
177. VOICE OF RUSSIA, supra note 135.
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eastward. 180 With this understanding of Russia's perception of
NATO's motivations, realism has not only had great
explanatory power in the context of the ongoing crisis; it may
also have had predictive power. As noted in the prior section,
George Kennan - the architect of the United States' original
policy of containment toward the Soviet Union in the late 1940s
- warned that NATO expansion was a "strategic blunder of
potentially epic proportions" that could one day lead to needless
confrontation with Russia. 18 Other realist scholars warned that
failing to respect Russia's core interests - that is, its basic need
for a buffer between its territorial landmass and the Western
alliance foremost among them - would
82 be the root of future
tension between Russia and the West.

IV. CONCLUSION
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has exposed the weakness of
International Law as a tool of managing international
relations. Despite great optimism that the end of the Cold War
laid the groundwork for an international system based on
respect for legal norms and institutions, the evidence of
Russia's intervention in Ukraine shows that the basic
assumptions of realism remain valid. These assumptions hold
that States are chronically concerned about their security in an
anarchical system in which no higher power can compel States
to pursue particular courses of action - and that this causes
States to be suspicious of others and to seek power above all
else. In such a world, there arguably is no room for law - not,
at least, as a genuinely influential variable affecting
international relations.
In the case of Ukraine, Russia has extensively used
rhetoric about International Law to justify its actions in front
of the global community. However, even while granting the
widest possible benefit of the doubt to Russia's arguments, it is
difficult to conclude that Russia has not violated a series of
international norms by annexing Crimea and supporting a
separatist movement in eastern Ukraine. With a more
thorough understanding of the security concerns at the root of
180. See Mearsheimer, supra note 6, at 77.
181. TALBOTT, supra note 48, at 220.
182. See Eugene Rumer, NATO Expansion: Strategic Genius or Historic
Mistake?, NAT'L INT. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-

expansion-strategic-genius-or-historic-mistake- 11114.
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Russia's policy on Ukraine, as well as the arguably faulty
Western policy of expanding NATO eastward, the conclusion
that International Law failed to constrain Russian behavior
seems inescapable. Furthermore, understanding why States
willingly violate legal norms to pursue their interests is
possible only within a realist conception of the international
system: there is no room for law and norms where States
perceive their only means of self-preservation to be the pursuit
of power.

